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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000239

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [CY](#) [GR](#) [TU](#) [NL](#)  
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/TURKEY/CYPRUS: DUTCH CONSIDER ENGAGING

REF: A) STATE 16987 B) BRUSSELS 351

Classified By: CDA Chat Blakeman; reasons 1.4 (c).

11. (C) Summary: MFA working level contacts responded positively to ref A demarche on February 2, and support the concept of using the Turkish proposal to restart final settlement talks. Obstacles within the EU, however, including perceived reluctance of the Austrian presidency, the ability of the Greek Cypriots to keep final settlement off the EU agenda, and perceptions the Turks are trying to renegotiate the Additional Protocol, will make progress difficult. While the working level contacts favored a more active Dutch approach, this has not been approved by higher levels; post will continue to follow up. End Summary.

12. (SBU) Poloff delivered ref A demarche on February 2 to Koos Dijkstra (MFA Senior Policy Advisor, Department of European Integration External Policy.) and Cyprus desk officer Mara van der Poel. Dijkstra was working on a position recommendation for the MFA regarding the Turkish proposals and emphasized that no official Dutch position yet existed.

13. (C) Van der Poel and Dijkstra said that the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) was doing everything it could to obstruct movement toward a final settlement. In this, they said, the Cypriots were aided by an Austrian presidency that had no wish to further the cause of Turkish accession. (Comment: This is not the reading in Brussels, ref B. End comment.) The picture was complicated by the perception among some EU member states, as well as some political constituencies within The Netherlands, that the Turks were renegotiating the Ankara protocol. Dijkstra stressed that these constituencies would react indignantly to any perception that the Turks were placing demands on an EU member state.

14. (C) Dijkstra and v/d Poel noted that the Turkish proposals had been on neither the GAERC agenda nor the agenda of the Committee on Southeastern Europe. When Poloff asked whether The Netherlands intended to engage actively on the issue, within the EU, Dijkstra answered that this would be his recommendation for the Minister. Dijkstra argued that the GONL could work through formal or informal channels. He indicated, with a shrug of his shoulders, that his government might ultimately choose not to force the issue.

15. (C) Dijkstra said that the GONL agreed that final settlement properly belonged in the UN. He agreed that a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation would certainly be the ideal but thought that it might not be realistic to try to return to what was. He welcomed our report that the Turkish proposal was not a take-it-or-leave-it one. He added that, within "the MFA" (read, at most: Western European and European Integration branches), initial reactions to the proposal had been positive. Dijkstra will be part of a Dutch

team heading next week to Cyprus, to look more closely at the  
issue.  
BLAKEMAN